


TOP SECRET

25X1



19 October 1962




Copy No. C Ed-8 25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

19 October 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Cuba: Twenty-second SAM site identified. (*Page i*)
2. USSR: Khrushchev says US-USSR bilateral problems can be resolved. (*Page ii*)

25X1


4. Congo: Adoula repudiates cease-fire and financial agreements reached with Tshombé. (*Page iv*)
5. Japan - Communist China: Japan will expand trade relations with Communist China. (*Page v*)

25X1

7. Syria - West Germany: Syria may ask bloc to finance Euphrates dam project. (*Page vii*)

25X1

25X1



18 OCT 62
621018-2

STAT

STAT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

19 October 1962

DAILY BRIEF


*Cuba: (Cuba's twenty-second SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) site is located near the Matanzas - Las Villas provincial border.)

25X1




(Information of 15 October also indicates that at least nine of the previously confirmed SAM installations are now probably operational. This information also reveals a new area of military concentration near the previously identified SAM assembly area at Santiago de las Vegas, just south of Havana.

25X1



25X1



USSR: (During his 15 October conversation with Finnish President Kekkonen, Khrushchev apparently attempted to leave the impression that there were no bilateral problems between the US and USSR on which agreement could not be reached.)

(Khrushchev did not mention the question of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, although in conversations last month with West European visitors he outlined a general course of action leading to a separate treaty. Kekkonen told Ambassador Kohler that Khrushchev felt an agreement with the US on Berlin could be reached, but that third countries posed obstacles.)

(Khrushchev expressed his high opinion of President Kennedy as a politician and statesman, but added that Kennedy encountered difficulties from public opinion and the press in the pursuit of his policies.)

(Khrushchev attempted to minimize the Soviet-Cuban agreement on the construction of a fishing port and stated that it "had no connection with a Soviet naval base." Khrushchev also made a point of doubting the efficacy of any US-imposed "blockade" of Cuba.)

19 Oct 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Congo: (Adoula's repudiation on 17 October of the cease-fire and financial agreements recently reached with Tshombé is the most serious threat to date to successful conclusion of the UN reconciliation plan.)

(Adoula declared that the agreements his representatives reached were "contrary to the spirit and letter" of the UN plan, which was not to be negotiated, but only to be accepted or rejected by Tshombé.)

(The repudiation casts doubts on Adoula's willingness to make concessions on the UN-drafted constitution, which in its present form is almost certainly unacceptable to Tshombé. Tshombé will now probably reverse the steps he has already taken.)

(Adoula has continued to distrust Tshombé despite his recent moves. He is under mounting pressures from domestic political and military forces. Soviet bloc and radical African diplomats have encouraged his belief that the UN plan is bound to fail, and that the UN should be expelled and assistance sought elsewhere.)

(Adoula and Foreign Minister Bomboko have already asked for US transport planes and pilots. Other officials have been pressing Adoula to accept Soviet offers of assistance.)

25X1

19 Oct 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

Japan - Communist China: (A Japanese industrial mission, armed with government-approved terms for extending trade credits to the Chinese, is about to leave for Peiping.)

(The Japanese mission is authorized to offer to sell steel products, machinery, and certain fertilizers on two years' maximum credit. Tokyo's approval will still be required, however, for each individual deal under this arrangement. Although the credit terms were designed primarily to accommodate Japanese business elements interested in the China mainland market, the Japanese vice foreign minister has said that comparable terms will also be offered to non-Communist Asian countries.)

(Ambassador Reischauer believes that the factor determining the level of Japanese trade with Communist China probably will be what the Chinese can offer Japan, however, rather than what the Japanese offer China.)

25X1

19 Oct 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3


Syria - West Germany: The Syrian Government, frustrated by German procrastination on a promised loan to build a major dam on the Euphrates River, may seek Soviet bloc financing.

The loan was originally offered while Syria was part of the UAR. Bonn now doubts that the Syrians will be able to raise their share of the money for the project or that they have the technical capacity to carry it out.

In addition, the UAR has been pressing German officials to drop the loan. In light of these considerations, the Germans are trying to limit their participation by creating a Western consortium to underwrite the project.

The Syrian Government is under internal pressure to take retaliatory action, including recognition of East Germany.

25X1



19 Oct 62

DAILY BRIEF

vii

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006600410001-3

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP78T00975A006600410001-3

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP78T00975A006600410001-3

TOP SECRET